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TRADEMARKS-UNFAIR CoMPETITION-ScoPE OF FEDERAL JURISDIC·
TION UNDER SECTION 43(a) OF THE LANHAM Acr-Plaintiff, a manufacturer
and distributor of engine bearings and connecting rods for internal combustion engines, brought suit in a federal district court to enjoin the
defendant from marketing and distributing the latter's products in containers which closely resembled those of the plaintiff, thereby falsely
representing that the goods were produced by and originated with the
plaintiff. The cause of action was based solely on section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act. 1 In dismissing the complaint,2 the district court ruled that
any attempt to characterize the complaint as charging a "false description
or representation" was without merit, and that "false designation of origin,"
as referred to in the act, is limited to geographic origin and does not
encompass "origin by manufacturer.'' 3 On appeal from the order dismissing
the complaint, held, reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Section 43(a) creates a federal right of action against particular kinds of
unfair competition in interstate commerce. Since the complaint charges
false description and misrepresentation, as well as false designation of
manufacturer, it states a cause of action within the original jurisdiction of
the federal courts. Federal-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 313 F.2d
405 (6th Cir. 1963).
The stated purpose of the Lanham Act is to make actionable the
deceptive and misleading use of "marks" in interstate commerce.4 Section
43(a) of the act gives a plaintiff the right to bring a civil action against any
person entering into commerce goods or services which bear false descriptions, representations, or designations of origin.5 The usual limitations of
jurisdictional amount and diversity of citizenship are not applicable.6
Prior to the passage of the Lanham Act the federal courts ordinarily
were unwilling to assume jurisdiction of cases of unfair competition unless
1 60 Stat. 441 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1958): "Any person who shall affix, apply,
or annex, or use in connection with any goods or services, or any container or containers
for goods, a false designation of origin, or any false description or representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same, and
shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce ..• shall be liable to a civil
action by any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin or
in the region in which said locality is situated, or by any person who believes that he is
or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation.''
2 Federal-Mognl-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 201 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. Ohio 1962).
3 In dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the district court
reasoned that "the remedy for a false designation of origin is a civil action which may be
brought by any person doing business in the locality falsely designated. If this were
applied to the facts, not only might this plaintiff bring the action, but any person
doing business near one of the plaintiff's plants could file suit • . • • Such a construction
would open nearly all the field of unfair competition to federal jurisdiction.'' Id. at 789.
4 60 Stat. 443 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. IV, 1963). The act defines
"mark" as meaning any trademark, whether registered or not. "Trademark" includes any
word, name, symbol, or device used to identify goods and distinguish them from those
manufactured or sold by others. Ibid.
5 See note 1 supra.
6 60 Stat. 440 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1121 (1958).
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the plaintiff could prove that the defendant had been guilty of "passing off"
his goods as those of the plaintiff.7 In effect, no relief was given unless some
property right of the plaintiff, such as a registered trademark, was actually
invaded.8 Although the federal courts did give relief in some cases,9 the
disadvantage in not having a federal law of unfair competition was that a
plaintiff bringing suit in a federal court was bound by the substantive law
of the forum state.10 This meant that different jurisdictions might afford
different remedies, and generally a majority of states limited recovery to
those cases where "passing off" could be proved.
An attempt was made to enact a federal law of unfair competition when
section 3 of the Trade Mark Act of 192011 was passed. However, this provision was rarely used because it failed to give a remedy for false descriptions and representations, 12 and the plaintiff had the burden of proving that
a false designation of origin occurred wilHully and with an intent to
deceive. 18 The few times when section 3 was made the basis of a complaint
in a federal court, the reference to "false designation of origin" in the act
was never read to mean "origin of manufacture," 14 as has been suggested
by the holding in the principal case.15
Occasionally it has been argued that section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act16 was intended to create a federal law of unfair competition.17 Section 5 proscribes "unfair methods of competition in com7 See .American Washboard v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 Fed. 281 (6th Cir. 1900). Occasional exceptions to this rule were made by the courts where there was a false designation of geographic origin and the plaintiff was an association of producers in a particular
geographic location. Grand Rapids Furniture Co. v. Grand Rapids Furniture Co., 127
F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 771 (1944); City of Carlsbad v. Tibbetts,
51 Fed. 852 (Mass. 1892). Exceptions were also made where the plaintiff had a monopoly.
Mosler Safe Co. v. Ely-Norris Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1925), rev'd on other grounds,
273 U.S. 132 (1927).
8 See generally Weil, Protectibility of Trademark Yalues Against False Competitive
Advertising, 44 CAI.IF. L. REv. 527 (1956).
9 See note 7 supra.
10 See, e.g., Pecheur Lozenge Co. v. National Candy Co., 315 U.S. 666, 666-67 (1942).
11 41 Stat. 534 (1920).
12 Section 3 of the 1920 act was the forerunner of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. It was
directed at any person who "willfully and with intent to deceive •• .'' affixed on "articles
of merchandise • • • a false designation of origin • • • tending to falsely identify the
origin of the merchandise • • • .'' A suit for damages could be brought by "any person,
firm or corporation doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin, or
in the region in which said locality is situated, or at the suit of any association of
persons, firms or corporations." 41 Stat. 534 (1920).
13 For a general discussion of the Trade Mark Act of 1920, see Derenberg, Federal
Unfair Competition Law at the End of the First Decade of the Lanham Act, in TRADE·
MARKS IN AcrION 14, 20 (1957).
14 See, e.g., Parfumerie Roger et Gallet Societe Anonyme v. Godet, Inc., 17 T.M.R. I
(S.D.N.Y. 1926).
15 Principal case at 408.
16 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 52 Stat. Ill (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958).
17 See, e.g., Bunn, The National Law of Unfair Competition, 62 HARv. L. REv. 987
(1949). Bunn argues that there is nothing in the Federal Trade Commission Act which
indicates that the FTC has sole jurisdiction of unfair competition cases, and that section
5 has never been fully utilized because no one has ever realized its potential. Id. at 998.
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merce," and it has been suggested that the Federal Trade Commission has
exclusive standing to bring actions against violators.18 Although section 5
seems specifically to cover cases involving false descriptions of goods, its
effectiveness has been limited by the rule precluding private litigation, the
requirement that the suit be in the public interest,19 and the limited relief
provided by cease-and-desist orders.20 It is not unreasonable to assume,
however, that Congress, in passing section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,
intended to extend the federal law of unfair competition to cases not
covered by section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
Whether section 43(a) of the Lanham Act fashions a federal law of
unfair competition has been the subject of much dispute in the past
seventeen years. The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the question and
the courts of appeals21 are in complete disagreement. In the leading case of
L'Aiglon Apparel v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 22 the Third Circuit took the view
that section 43(a) creates a new federal statutory tort which is not to be
limited by the common-law doctrines of unfair competition.23 The L'A iglon
opinion represented the first "broad" construction given to 43(a) by a court
of appeals; it completely repudiated the "narrow" view expressed by the
Ninth Circuit in Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures Corp.24 In Chamberlain
18 Samson Crane Co. v. Union Nat'l Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218, 221 (D. Mass. 1949)
(dictum).
19 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 52 Stat. 112 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1958); see
FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 28 (1929).
20 For writings critical of the limitations of § 5 in unfair competition cases, see
Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition, 68 HAR.v. L. REv. 814, 894-95 (1955); Comment, 70
YALE L.J. 406, 425 (1961).
21 Compare L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954),
and Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928 (D.D.C. 1955), afj'd sub nom. S. C. Johnson,
Inc. v. Gold Seal Inc., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956), with
Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 186 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1951), and Samson Crane
Co. v. Union Nat'l Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218 (D. Mass. 1949), afj'd per curiam, 180 F.2d
896 (1st Cir. 1950).
22 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954); accord, Turner Hall Corp. v. Stylors Inc., 207 F. Supp.
865 (S.D. Fla. 1962); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Royal-Pioneer Paper Box Mfg. Co., 197 F.
Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
23 L'Aiglon Apparel v. Lana Lobell, Inc., supra note 21, at 651.
24 186 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1951). Prior to the decision in the principal case, only two
other courts of appeals had ruled directly on the question. In the District of Columbia
Circuit it has been held that § 43(a) not only gives the federal courts broad jurisdiction
over certain cases of unfair competition, but also that a plaintiff "need not show that
any false description or representation was willful or intentional, need not prove actual
diversion of trade (passing off), and need not establish a veritable monopoly position in
the industry." Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928 (D.D.C. 1955), afj'd sub nom.
S.C. Johnson, Inc. v. Gold Seal Inc., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829
(1956). The First Circuit has followed the view announced in Chamberlain. Samson
Crane Co. v. Union Nat'l Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218 (D. Mass. 1949), afj'd per curiam,
180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950). The Second Circuit has avoided a ruling on the question.
Joshua Meier Co. v. Albany Novelty Mfg. Co., 236 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1956); Maternally
Yours v. Your Maternity Shop, 234 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1956). The district courts in the
Second Circuit, however, have uniformly followed L'Aiglon. See, e.g., American Rolex
Watch Corp. v. Jack Laufer & Jan Voort, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 858 (E.D.N.Y. 1959); Mutation
Mink Breeders Ass'n v. Lou Nierenberg Co., 23 F.R.D. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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it was held that "passing off" is essential to recovery under section 43(a).25
The L'A iglon case went much further in its interpretation of 43(a). Although
the L'Aiglon opinion did not outline the bounds of substantive relief
available to a plaintiff, it seems safe to assume that the Third Circuit
would hear a case brought under 43(a) where the following conditions are
met: (1) There is a passing off. (2) A person advertises, labels, or packages
his product in such a way that the general public is likely to be deceived,
and the complainant's product sales and/or good will are, or are likely to
be, damaged.26 (3) A complainant is in business in a particular geographic
region, and that region is falsely indicated as the place of origin of the
goods of a competitor.21
The principal case highlights all of the basic issues in dispute, i.e.,
whether section 43(a) contains the germinal seed for a corpus of federal law
concerning unfair competition, or whether it was intended to be a restatement of the common law. In spite of the apparent confusion among the
federal courts, it seems almost naive to argue that section 43(a) was merely
an attempt to restate the common law existing at the time the Lanham Act
was passed. Most writers agree that the federal courts now have original
jurisdiction over a new federal law of unfair competition.28 As the L'Aiglon
case would suggest, a literal reading of the act29 makes it difficult to believe
that Congress intended simply to codify the "passing off" doctrine. In
addition, the legislative history30 of the act seems to make it clear that
43(a) "presents a Federal question for determination by the Federal Courts
on the basis of the Federal law." 31
The principal case is a perplexing decision in an already confused area
of the law. On the one hand, the Sixth Circuit sustained a complaint based
on "false description and representation" under 43(a), citing L'Aiglon.32
In so doing, the decision seems logically to imply that the Sixth Circuit intended to follow the announced "broad" interpretation given 43(a) by the
25 186 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1951); accord, Bechik Products v. Federal Silk Mills, 135
F. Supp. 570 (D. Md. 1955); Performed Line Prods. Co. v. Fanner Mfg. Co., 124 U.S.P.Q.
288 (N.D. Ohio 1960).
26 In the principal case the plaintiff alleged that the acts of the defendant had caused
damage to its business, reputation, and good will. Principal case at 407.
27 For an interesting general discussion of the limitations of a cause of action under
§ 43(a) see the reasoning of the court in Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928 (D.D.C.
1955). See also Weil, supra note 8, at 536.
28 See l CALLMAN, UNFAIR. COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS § 18.2(b) (Supp. 1947);
VANDENBURGH, TRADE-MARK LAw AND PROCEDURE§ 11.30 (1959); Bunn, supra note 17, at 999.
29 60 Stat. 441 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1958). See note 33 infra.
30 "Trade is no longer local, but is national. Marks used in interstate commerce are
properly the subject of Federal regulation ••.. There is no essential difference between
trade-marks infringement and what is loosely called unfair competition •••• To protect
trademarks ••• is to protect the public from deceit, [and] to foster fair competition ...•
This is the end to which this bill is directed." S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 5
(1946).
31 ROBERT, THE NEW TRADE MARK MANUAL 186 (1946).
32 Principal case at 408.
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Third Circuit.88 However, in a later part of the opinion, Samson Crane Co. v.
Union Nat'l Sales, Inc. 84 was cited to support the proposition that 43(a)
should be "construed to refer not to any competitive practice which in the
broad meaning of the words might be called unfair, but to that 'unfair competition' which has been closely associated with the misuse of trademarks,
i.e., the passing off of one's own goods as those of a competitor."85 The
adoption of this quotation from Samson Crane makes it unclear whether
the Sixth Circuit followed L'Aiglon and the view that 43(a) creates a new
federal law of unfair competition, or whether the court simply felt that, on
the facts of the case, there was a legitimate case of "passing off."
The alternative holding8 6 in the principal case was that "the word,
'origin,' in the Act does not merely refer to geographical origin, but also
to origin of source or manufacture."87 Unfortunately, it appears that the
issue was given only a superficial treatment by the court, because a literal
interpretation of the statute shows that "origin" was intended to mean only
geographic origin. The problem is that the decision failed to recognize that
43(a) creates two separate causes of action and a different remedy for each
of the actions. First, the statute proscribes "false designation of origin," and
for such an offense a defendant may be liable to any "person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin or in the region in
which said locality is situated . . . ." 38 Second, the statute proscribes any
"false description or representation," and a violator may be liable to "any
person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged ...." 39 If, in the
first part of the statute, "origin" is read to mean not only geographic origin,
but also source of manufacture, as the principal case holds,40 then any
person doing business in the region or locality of the manufacturer who
is falsely designated would be entitled to bring suit under 43(a).41 The
unlikelihood that any person doing business in the locality, other than a
competitor, could prove actual damage casts serious doubt on the soundness
of this interpretation. Such uncertainty approaches conviction of error
33 " 'Palming off,' narrowly conceived, was said to be essential to any recovery and
the view has been expressed judicially that some such limitation is to be read into
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act •••• However, we reject this entire approach to the
statute. We find nothing in the legislative history of the Lanham Act to justify the view
that this section is merely declarative of existing law." L'Aiglon Apparel v. Lana Lobell,
Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 651 (3d Cir. 1954).
84 87 F. Supp. 218 (D. Mass. 1949), afj'd per curiam, 180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950).
85 87 F. Supp. 218, 222 (D. Mass. 1949).
36 In dismissing the principal case, the district court addressed itself primarily to the
meaning of the word "origin" in § 43(a). 201 F. Supp. 788, 789 (N.D. Ohio 1962). While
it is difficult to tell whether the definition of "origin" announced by the Sixth Circuit
was intended to be only dictum, it must be given heavy weight in reading the opinion
because the district court dismissed the case on the basis of its definition of origin, and
the plaintiff's complaint alleged a false designation of origin.
37 Principal case at 408.
88 60 Stat. 441 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1958). (Emphasis added.)
89 Ibid.
40 Principal case at 408.
41 See note 3 supra.
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when it is noted that the word "origin" is qualified by the words "locality"
and "region," both of which are geographic references.
It is difficult to ascertain just where the Sixth Circuit stands. A strong
argument can be made that the principal case stands for the limited
proposition that packaging techniques alone are capable of being adjudged a "misrepresentation" that the goods of one are in fact the goods
of another. This in itself would have been a sufficient ground for reversal.42
And although the court does not, when dealing with the "false description
and representation" aspect of 43(a), explicitly state that "passing off" need
not be proved, it does so implicitly by citing L'A iglon and American Rolex.48
However, it would be dangerous to rely on that part of the decision which
interprets "origin" as "source of manufacture." This alternative holding is
supported by a quotation from Samson Crane, which is contrary to the
reasoning of L'Aiglon; it requires a strained statutory construction and is
unnecessary in light of the broad interpretation of "false description and
representation."
Harry T. Edwards

42 The district court held that the allegations were not sufficient to state a cause of
action for false description or representation. 201 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. Ohio 1962).
48 176 F. Supp. 858 (E.D.N.Y. 1959).

